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The purpose of the present study was to further investigate age differences in 
children’s understanding how counterfactual reasoning affects emotions. More 
specifically, the study was designed to study the effect of the salience of the 
counterfactual alternative on judgments of others’ emotions, and to examine possible 
correlates of individual differences in the understanding of counterfactual-reasoning-
based emotions. The individual differences that were measured were verbal ability, 
information processing capacity, and perspective taking ability.  
 Thirty 6-year-olds, 36 7-year-olds, 36 8-year-olds, and 34 adults were each 
presented 4 scenarios.  Each story involved two characters who experienced the same 
negative outcome; one character, however, would have avoided the outcome if he had 
made a different decision, whereas the other character would not have been able to avoid 
that outcome even if he had made the alternate decision. For half of the participants, the 
stories were written in such a way that it was made very salient that the characters 
reflected on “what might have been” if they had made the alternate decision about what 
to do; that information was less salient in the stories presented to the remaining 
participants.  The participants also completed the measures of individual differences in 
processing capacity, verbal ability, and perspective taking ability.  
Overall, adults stated that the character who could have avoided the negative 
outcome would feel worse about his or her choice than would the other character, but the 
majority of the children stated that the two characters would feel the same. When the 
characters’ thoughts were explicitly stated (high salience stories), however, 8-year-olds 
showed a response pattern closer to that of the adults than they did with the lower 
salience stories.  
The analyses of individual differences revealed that, after age was taken into 
account, perspective taking (as measured by a test of second-order theory of mind ability) 
was the only measure of individual difference that remained a significant predictor of 
counterfactual emotion understanding. The importance of different social cognitive 
abilities for understanding people’s affective responses to thinking about alternatives is 
discussed.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
When people think about how things could have happened differently by mentally 
altering past events, they are engaging in “counterfactual” thinking. Research has shown 
that a number of situational factors affect the degree to which people will engage in 
counterfactual reasoning.  These factors, which include exceptionality, involvement, 
controllability, and timing (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese & Olson, 1995), affect 
counterfactual reasoning by making an aspect of a situation more “mutable,” that is, more 
easily changed mentally to permit consideration of an alternate reality.  For example, a 
person is more likely to think about alternatives to reality when the situation involves an 
atypical or exceptional course of action rather than a typical or normal routine, when the 
person is more rather than less involved in the cause of an outcome, when the situation is 
thought to be readily controllable, and when the outcome is temporally close to an 
alternative outcome.  
Counterfactual reasoning serves two major purposes: 1) to help people learn from 
their mistakes for future decision-making, and 2) to help people feel better about 
situations that could have been worse (Roese & Olson, 1995). Judgments about what 
could have changed a situation, and what alternate outcome could have resulted, have 
also been found to evoke certain emotions. These emotions, such as 
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regret, relief, and disappointment, are termed “counterfactual emotions” because all 
involve a comparison of a present situation with an imagined alternative to reality” 
(Roese & Olson, 1995).  Different types of counterfactual thinking determine these 
emotions. Counterfactual thinking can be upward, which occurs when the imagined 
alternative to reality is more positive than the actual situation, or downward, in which the 
imagined alternative to reality is more negative than the actual situation (Kasimatis & 
Wells, 1995). When a person engages in upward counterfactual thinking, it is likely that 
he or she will feel regret. If the person engages in downward counterfactual thinking, 
however, that person would be likely to feel relief.  
Counterfactual thinking has also been linked to the understanding of causal 
relations. Wells and Gavinski (1989) showed that people attribute greater causality to an 
antecedent when an alteration of that antecedent would have caused a different outcome 
than if altering the antecedent would have led to the same outcome. In their study, when 
participants were presented with a story in which a woman died from an allergic reaction 
from a meal chosen by her boss, the choice of dish was given more weight if the dish not 
chosen would not have caused the reaction than if the reaction would have occurred even 
if the alternative dish had been chosen. Wells and Gavinski (1989) concluded that when 
an event is perceived as causal, it must have a counterfactual that would not have caused 
the outcome and that the mental availability of the counterfactual alternative affects the 
perceived degree of causality. 
Recent research with children has begun to explore the role of counterfactual 
thinking in children’s judgments of causality. Harris, German, and Mills (1996) presented 
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children scenarios in which an obvious alternative would have changed the outcome (e.g., 
using a pencil instead of a black pen would not have caused Sally’s fingers to get inky) or 
in which the obvious alternative would not have changed the outcome (e.g., if Sally had 
chosen a leaky blue pen instead of a leaky black pen her fingers still could have gotten 
inky). Harris et al. (1996) found that children 3 to 5 years of age were able to differentiate 
actions that could have prevented the outcome from actions that would have resulted in 
the same outcome and, based upon the use of the counterfactual information, made 
judgments of causality accordingly. The finding that children demonstrate counterfactual 
reasoning abilities as part of their causal reasoning judgments beginning at 3-4 years of 
age is supported by other research as well (German, 1999; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & 
Mitchell, 1998).  
While young children are able to use counterfactual reasoning to determine 
causality for different events, it remains unclear if children understand how 
counterfactual reasoning affects people’s emotional responses to such situations, and it is 
not known how this understanding develops. Although previous researchers have found 
that children are able to understand the situations that produce the basic emotions of 
happiness and sadness by 5 years of age (Fabes, Eisenberg, Nyman, & Michaelieu, 1991), 
are able to understand how the anticipation of happiness and sadness affects behavior by 
5 years of age (Denham, 1988; Denham & Couchard, 1990; Strayer, 1986), and are able 
to understand how situations affect self-conscious emotions (e.g., pride, guilt, shame) 
after 7 years of age (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Berti, Garattoni, & Venturini, 2000; Harris, 
Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987; Harter & Whitesell, 1989; Nunner-Winker & 
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Sodian, 1988; Thompson, 1987), much less research has been done concerning the link 
between children’s understanding of counterfactual reasoning and emotional responses.  
In a recent study relevant to this issue, Meehan and Byrne (2005) presented 6 and 
8 year old children with 2 characters playing a card game in which each character picked 
a card, and if the cards were the same, they won a prize. Research with adults, using 
similar kinds of scenarios, has found evidence for a temporal order effect with respect to 
judgments of guilt and the assignment of blame when the prize wasn’t won; adult 
participants judge the character who was the second one to pick a card as being more to 
blame and feeling more guilt concerning the outcome than was the case for the first 
character (Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & Gunasegaram, 
1990; Walsh & Byrne, 2004). Meehan and Byrne (2005) found that although both groups 
of children in their study were able to understand how the situation could have been 
different, the 6-year-olds judged that both characters would feel equally guilty and 
blamed the two characters equally, whereas the 8-year-olds demonstrated judgments 
similar to those previously found with adult participants. 
Only two studies have been reported that focus directly on the question of the 
development of the understanding of regret and relief. Amsel et al. (2003) found that 
although preschool children were able to judge how they and others would feel if they 
had received an imagined, “alternative to reality” outcome that was either more positive 
or more negative than what actually occurred, it was not until about seven years of age 
that children understood that this knowledge would affect their feelings toward the 
outcome. These findings suggested that although children as young as three or four years 
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of age may be able to understand how they and others would feel if events had unfolded 
differently from the way they actually occurred, (in other words, they can reflect on 
alternatives to reality and can make appropriate judgments of emotion responses for the 
basic emotions of happiness and sadness), it is not until children are about seven years of 
age that they understand how imagined counterfactual alternatives may affect feelings 
about actual events. 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) examined children’s understanding of the effects of 
factors affecting event mutability on judgments on both regret and relief. In their first 
experiment, which focused on the understanding of regret, children and adults were 
presented scenarios in which two characters experienced the same negative outcome but 
differed with respect to either the typicality of their actions or whether the critical 
decision involved an act of commission or omission. Guttentag and Ferrell found that 7-
year-olds responded similarly to adults, judging that characters who actively chose the 
outcome or who strayed from a typical routine would feel worse about a negative 
outcome than would those who were more passive or who followed a usual routine.  
Five-year-olds, however, did not take these aspects of the decision into account when 
judging characters’ feelings. In fact, the most common response from 5-year-olds was 
that the two characters would feel the same because they both experienced the same 
outcome.  
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) also included scenarios in which the characters 
might feel relief as a result of downward counterfactual thinking. As was the case with 
the first experiment, these stories involved two characters who differed with respect to 
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the typicality of a course of action or the degree to which the course of action resulted 
from an act of commission vs. omission. The only difference between the stories in the 
two experiments was that the characters in the second experiment experienced a positive 
rather than a negative outcome and “would have” experienced a more negative outcome 
if the alternative course of action had been chosen. Participants were asked to judge 
which character would feel happier about the outcome or whether they would feel the 
same. The pattern of results for the relief scenarios was different from the one found with 
regret scenarios, even though the stories used for each were structurally identical. 
Whereas 7-year-olds responded similarly to adults with the regret scenarios, there was a 
much more marked age difference between 7-year-olds and adults in the relief data. 
Adults also showed a somewhat reduced tendency to take into account the mutability of 
the decision; on average 62% of adults responded that the character whose decision was 
more mutable would feel better (i.e., would feel greater relief), whereas on average with 
regret judgments 79% of adults responded that the character whose decision was more 
mutable would feel worse. For the 7-year-olds, however, most participants in the second 
experiment judged that the two characters would feel the same, a finding which stands in 
marked contrast with the pattern of results at this age when judgments of regret rather 
than relief were assessed. 
Guttentag and Ferrell’s findings with regard to the understanding of regret 
indicate that although children are able to reason counterfactually by age 5 years, it is not 
until 7 years of age that they show an understanding of how counterfactual reasoning can 
affect people’s emotions. The study of the understanding of relief showed that 7-year-
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olds and adults were less likely to use counterfactual reasoning when judging other’s 
emotions than those groups in the regret studies; indeed, for the 7-year-olds, little 
evidence was found that the children factored alternatives to reality into their emotional 
response judgments at all when the outcome of the situations was neutral or positive.  
This difference between responses for negative and positive outcomes has been 
found in previous studies with adult participants. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
presented adult participants with vignettes in which two characters experienced the same 
negative outcome, but where one character performed an action and one character did not 
act to cause the outcome. They found the typical pattern of results with these kinds of 
judgments: participants judged that the character who acted would feel more regret than 
would the character who did not act. Landman (1987) gave adult participants vignettes 
similar to that of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), but included some stories in which the 
outcomes were positive. Participants were asked to judge which character felt more regret 
in the negative outcome conditions and also which character felt better in the positive 
outcome conditions. Landman found that for both outcome valances participants judged 
that the character who made an active decision would feel the resulting emotion more 
than did the other character. However, this pattern was significantly stronger for the 
stories with negative outcomes than for the stories with positive outcomes.  Landman 
explains these findings as being due to our tendency to mentally weigh negative events 
more heavily than we do positive events. 
Gleicher et al. (1990) performed a study similar to Landman’s (1987) in which 
they investigated the effect of making the negative alternative to the positive outcome 
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more salient by explicitly stating the counterfactual alternative in the vignette. They felt 
that the differences found between positive outcome vignettes (relief) and negative 
outcome vignettes (regret) were due to the negative outcomes being more likely to elicit 
thinking about an alternative outcome and thus alternative antecedents. As in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1982) study and Landman’s (1987) study, the decision by the characters 
to follow a particular course of action was framed as an act of commission for one 
character and as an act of omission for the other character. Gleicher et al.’s results 
replicated the findings from the previous studies for the vignettes with negative 
outcomes, whether or not the counterfactual alternative was explicitly stated. They also 
found that when the outcome was positive and the counterfactual alternative was not 
explicitly stated, participants were significantly less likely to judge that the character that 
acted would feel better than the character who did not act. However, when the outcome 
was positive and the alternative was explicitly stated (salient condition), participants were 
highly likely to judge that the character who acted would feel better than the character 
who did not act.  
Based on these findings, Gleicher et al. (1990) developed a four stage model to 
describe the process of feeling an emotion after imagining a counterfactual alternative. In 
Stage 1, the person creates a counterfactual outcome as a response to an actual outcome. 
In Stage 2, the person generates possible steps to having attained this counterfactual 
outcome. In Stage 3, the person judges the likelihood of the counterfactual outcome 
occurring based on these possible steps. In Stage 4, affective experience is based on the 
quality of the counterfactual alternative, the nature of the events that might lead to this 
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counterfactual alternative, the likelihood of this counterfactual situation, and the valance 
of the outcome that actually occurred. Gleicher et al. (1990) claim that with negative 
outcomes, a person experiences all four stages, but with positive outcomes, the first stage 
is not activated because people are not likely to spontaneously imagine alternatives to 
positive outcomes. In other words, they propose that negative outcomes serve as a much 
stronger trigger for, or supporter of, counterfactual reflection. 
Proposed Study 
The purpose of the present study was to examine further the development of 
children’s understanding of the effects of counterfactual-reasoning based emotions.  
More specifically, the first goal of this study was to investigate how the manipulation of 
the salience of counterfactuals alternatives affects age differences in using counterfactual 
alternatives to understand others’ affective states. The second goal of the study was to 
examine how individual differences in information processing capacity, verbal ability, 
and theory of mind ability predict performance on a measure of children’s understanding 
of counterfactual reasoning-based emotions. 
Effect of the Salience of the Counterfactual Alternative 
Gleicher et al.’s study and model suggest that, for adults, the salience of an 
alternative-to-reality outcome affects the likelihood that emotion judgments will be 
affected by counterfactual reasoning processes. Gleicher et al.’s (1990) model may also 
assist in explaining the age differences in counterfactual reasoning that have been 
previously discussed in this paper. Gleicher et al. (1990) implied that the reason adults do 
not judge more feelings of relief for a character who acts than a character who does not 
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act when the alternative is not explicitly stated is because a positive event does not 
provide a strong enough trigger for the first stage of the process to occur. When, 
however, the process is triggered by explicit presentation of the possible alternative 
outcome, adults’ emotion judgments for positive outcomes are affected by counterfactual 
reasoning in a manner parallel to the processes that occur for negative outcomes. 
These findings raise the possibility that the “understanding” of counterfactual-
reasoning-based emotions may not develop in an all-or-none manner. Rather, there may 
be age differences in the general tendency or ability to engage in counterfactual 
reasoning, and this pattern of age differences should interact with the strength of the 
“trigger” for counterfactual reasoning present in any situation to affect whether the 
alternative-outcome is taken into account when making an emotion response judgment. 
Thus, it is predicted, that when a counterfactual alternative is more explicitly stated, 
children will show adult-like performance at an earlier age than when the alternative is 
not explicit. 
Individual Differences 
In addition to studying the effects of manipulating the salience of the 
counterfactual outcome, the second goal of this study was to examine predictors of 
individual differences in the understanding of how counterfactual reasoning affects 
emotions. Presumably, by identifying factors associated with individual differences, we 
should learn more about the factors responsible for age-related changes in the 
understanding of counterfactual reasoning-based emotions. The factors of individual 
differences I investigated are based on the different abilities an individual needs to make 
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an emotion judgment in a counterfactual reasoning task, with certain abilities showing 
more influence at different stages of the process of a counterfactual reasoning task, such 
as in the process outlined by Gleicher et al. (1990).  
While the model provided by Gleicher et al. is sufficient to describe the steps a 
person experiences when thinking of an alternative and then feeling a certain emotion, 
several elaborations are needed to describe the steps involved for a participant who is 
judging the emotions of two characters based on their mental actions of counterfactual 
reasoning. A participant in the previously mentioned studies involving the comparison of 
two characters (Gleicher et al., 1990; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Landman, 1987; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) must engage in thinking about the characters’ mental 
processes, then go through the steps as described by Gleicher et al. for each character, 
then compare the two characters’ affective responses based on these individual mental 
evaluations (see Figure 1).   
According to this model, a participant must not only be able to go through the 
process of counterfactual reasoning to understand certain emotions, but also use 
perspective taking skills to understand other people’s mental processes, as well as the 
ability to hold all of these steps in mind in order to accurately compare the two 
characters. Therefore, for young children, the age differences that have been found when 
participants are asked to determine who would feel worse when both characters 
experience an identical outcome, but are differing with respect to their mental reasoning, 
may be a result of problems with perspective taking or mental capacity instead of merely 
a problem with counterfactual reasoning. This idea is supported by the fact that adults 
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tend not to take antecedents into account when making judgments of emotions when the 
alternative is not salient, even though they clearly have the ability to do so (Gleicher et 
al., 1990; Landman, 1987). 
Understanding of Mental States 
False Belief Tasks. The first step required for participants in this study, and 
previous similar studies, is to think about the characters’ mental processes involved in 
counterfactual reasoning.  The ability to think about others’ mental states has been found 
to emerge around 3-4 years of age (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Wellman, 1992).
When children gain this ability, they are said to possess a “theory of mind” (Astington et 
al., 1988; Wellman, 1992).
There is reason to believe that the development of a theory of mind is related to 
the development of the understanding of counterfactual emotions. Several researchers 
have found a relationship between performance on false belief tasks and basic 
counterfactual reasoning abilities (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Riggs & Peterson, 
2000; Riggs et al., 1998). The reason for the connection between these two abilities 
remains unclear, however. Riggs et al. (1998) suggest that young children’s difficultly 
with false belief tasks is due to problems with modified derivation (see Peterson & Riggs, 
1999), which requires counterfactual reasoning ability. To use the modified derivation 
strategy, children must be able to ignore a piece of information and impose a new reality 
onto the situation. This ability to ignore reality for an alternative situation is a key to both 
counterfactual reasoning and performance on false belief tasks, where participants must 
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be able to think about an imaginary situation or belief different from what they know to 
be true.  
Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) also found that counterfactual reasoning 
ability predicts false belief task performance, and suggest that this relationship may be 
the result of language ability, cognitive flexibility, or other cognitive abilities such as 
working memory or inhibitory control. They also suggest that although there is just a 
correlational relationship between counterfactual reasoning and false belief task 
performance, they argue for a causal relationship between the two variables such that 
counterfactual reasoning ability is necessary for, and therefore should develop before, the 
development of a theory of mind.  
Arguing somewhat against this position, German and Nichols (2003) found that 
task complexity affects performance on tasks of counterfactual reasoning. They presented 
3-and 4-year-olds with scenarios describing a series of causal events, and asked them to 
reason about alternatives that could have occurred at different parts of the story, creating 
the need for short, medium, or long lengths of inference. Children were also given 
standard false belief tasks. German and Nichols found a correlation between 
counterfactual reasoning and false belief tasks for the medium and long chains of 
inference, but not the short chain, after age was partialled out as a variable. Three-year-
olds were able to correctly reason counterfactually when presented with the shorter 
chains of counterfactual reasoning, but had difficulty with the longer chains and the false 
belief tasks, suggesting that problems with false belief tasks were not a result of an 
inability to reason counterfactually per se. German and Nichols state that these results 
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indicate that there may be a more complex type of counterfactual reasoning ability that 
needs to develop to solve problems involving longer chains of inference and also to solve 
false belief tasks. They suggest that the development of basic cognitive abilities such as 
increased inhibitory control and working memory capacity may be the basis for 
correlations between counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding. 
Adding further to the complexity of the picture regarding counterfactual reasoning 
and theory of mind, Perner, Sprung, and Steinkogler (2004) did not find a correlation 
between counterfactual reasoning ability and false belief task performance once they 
partialled out age and verbal intelligence. In their study, children 3-5 years of age were 
able to solve a simple counterfactual problem, but had more difficulty with a more 
complex counterfactual scenario and the false belief tasks. These results suggest that 
because children were able to reason counterfactually in the simple scenario they should 
have the ability to respond accurately to the false belief questions, but the difference in 
performance and lack of a correlation imply that performance on these tasks is affected 
by differences in task and information processing demands.  
Emotion Understanding. Whether or not children are able to reason 
counterfactually or understand false beliefs and hold a theory of mind, understanding 
other people’s emotions resulting from counterfactual reasoning not only involves both of 
these abilities but the coordinated us of both of these abilities. Bradmetz and Schnieder 
(1999, 2004) have included questions about emotions in false belief tasks and found that 
children can understand a false belief (i.e., that Little Red Riding Hood believes her 
grandma is in the bed) but still give incorrect emotional assessments despite that 
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knowledge (i.e., that Little Red Riding Hood is afraid). They have shown that there is a 
developmental lag between understanding false beliefs and understanding false emotions 
based on that belief (Bradmetz & Schnieder, 1999), and also between false belief 
understanding and knowing if a character thinks he or she would be able to fulfill their 
desires in this false state of affairs (Bradmetz & Schnieder, 2004).   
In a related study by Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, and Cooke (1989), 
children were told a story about a toy elephant that liked to drink either milk or Coke (but 
not both). They were told that a monkey switched the drinks and put them in the wrong 
containers. When 4- and 6-year-olds were asked how the elephant would feel when she 
drank the contents, both age groups were able to express the correct answers. When they 
were asked how she would feel before opening the container, however, 4-year-olds did 
not take the elephant’s beliefs into account and instead responded according to their own 
beliefs. Six-year-olds accurately judged how the elephant would feel before opening the 
container based on her beliefs. This study by Harris et al. shows that even though 4-year-
olds are able to identify people’s basic emotions and are able to understand false beliefs, 
they have difficulty with tasks requiring them to make, and logically integrate, both kinds 
of judgments simultaneously. 
In counterfactual reasoning tasks, participants are required to think about each 
character’s mental processes following the steps involved in Gleicher et al.’s (1990) 
model, a process that is similar to false belief tasks in the sense that both tasks require 
participants to think about the mental states of another person. The process of thinking 
about a person engaging in the mental processes involved in Gleicher et al.’s 
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counterfactual-reasoning-based-emotions model is more complex, however, than that 
required by false belief tasks.  Indeed, whereas children as young as 3-4 years of age can 
successfully perform a theory of mind task, it is not until about 7 years of age that 
participants are usually able to use take counterfactual situation emotion responses into 
account when judging a character’s emotional responses to what actually occurred.  
A more complex theory of mind task that has been used to study older children’s 
understanding of other people’s mental states is the second order theory of mind task 
(Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). In a second order 
theory of mind task a participant must be able to understand a character’s beliefs about 
another character’s beliefs.  Research using second order theory of mind tasks has 
demonstrated that they are more challenging than standard false beliefs tasks, although 
the exact age at which children can solve such tasks remains unclear; whereas Perner and 
Wimmer’s original experiment found that is it not until 6 or 7 years of age that children 
successfully perform a second order theory of mind task, Sullivan et al. modified the 
stories to reduce the complexity of the stories while keeping the same structure and 
purpose, and found that children were able to successfully perform the tasks by 5 to 6 
years of age. 
In general, both second order theory of mind tasks and the kinds of 
counterfactual-reasoning-based emotion judgment tasks used in the present study would 
seem to have overlapping task demands; each requires not just the ability to understand 
another person’s mental state, but the ability to make a judgment based upon the 
coordination of information about two people’s mental states.  Accordingly, in the 
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present study, one of the tasks presented to participants as a possible predictor of 
performance on the emotion judgment tasks was a second order theory of mind task.   
Information Processing Capacity 
The focus on the parallel levels of complexity of second order theory of mind 
tasks and tasks designed to assess the understanding of regret highlights the possible role 
of general information processing capacity as a variable that may affect performance on 
both kinds of tasks.  Notably, an influence of information processing capacity on the 
relationship between false belief tasks and counterfactual reasoning tasks has been 
suggested previously by German and Nichols (2003) and Guajardo and Turley-Ames 
(2004), and other researchers have found a correlation between false belief tasks and 
measures of working memory capacity (Gordon & Olson, 1998). Because false belief 
tasks and counterfactual reasoning tasks both rely on an ability to think about an outcome 
while holding a different prior event in mind, it seems very plausible that age-related 
increases in processing capacity could be affecting both abilities. In the present study, 
along with previous similar experiments (Gleicher et al., 1990; Guttentag & Ferrell, 
2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987), participants must be able to 
remember and consider the events of the story, both characters’ mental processes, and 
compare the two characters in order to respond to the relevant test question. Thus 
performance on these tasks and the understanding of counterfactual emotions more 
generally may be limited by young children’s limited processing capacity. Accordingly, 
the present study included measures of processing capacity in order to examine the 
relationship between processing capacity and the understanding of regret.   
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Verbal Ability 
Another factor that has been found to be related to counterfactual reasoning 
ability is verbal ability.  Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) found that when language 
ability was included as a control variable, age effects for performance on a counterfactual 
reasoning task were removed. Similarly, Perner et al. (2004) found that when age and 
verbal intelligence was controlled, the correlation between the false belief tasks and 
counterfactual reasoning tasks was eliminated. In the domain of emotion understanding, 
Pons, Lawson, Harris, and deRosnay (2003), who studied individual variability in 
emotion understanding, found a strong relationship between language ability and the 
ability to attribute basic emotions (e.g., happy, sad, just alright, scared) when presented 
with different scenarios in children aged 4-11 years, even when age was controlled. They 
suggest that language is important for the understanding of emotions because language is 
a tool of both cognitive representation and social communication. Verbal ability will 
therefore also be assessed in the present study to investigate any possible relationship 
between verbal ability and performance on the counterfactual emotion task used in this 
study.  
Summary 
In summary, the purpose of the present study was to examine the development of 
children’s understanding of regret by manipulating the salience of the counterfactual 
alternative, and by examining factors correlated with individual differences in the 
understanding of counterfactual emotions. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
The participants were 30 6-year-olds (M = 5.9 years, SD = 3.9 months), 36 7- 
year-olds (M = 7.1 years, SD = 4.5 months), and 36 8-year-olds (M = 8.2 years, SD = 3.4 
months). There were 24 females and 6 males in the youngest age group, 17 females and 
19 males in the middle age group, and 14 females and 22 males in the oldest age group. 
The children were selected from a parochial school and had parental permission to 
participate.  
Thirty-four adults (M = 24.9 years, SD = 114.7 months) were also presented the 
counterfactual emotion reasoning task (but not any of the measures of individual 
differences in language, processing capacity, or second-order theory-of-mind ability). 
The adults were selected from psychology courses and received course credit for their 
participation. 
Materials 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 3rd edition (PPVT). The PPVT is a measure of 
receptive language and was used as a measure of verbal ability in this study. In this task, 
on each trial, a label was provided to the participant by the experimenter, and the 
participant indicated which picture out of four options he or she thought best represented 
that label. 
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Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC) Number Recall. The number 
recall subtest of the K-ABC assesses forward memory span. In this task, on each trial, the 
experimenter stated a series of numbers, and the participant attempted to repeat the 
numbers in the correct order. The length of the number sequence increased with each unit 
of 3 items. 
M-space span task. The M-space span task is a measure of memory span 
developed by Case, Kurland, and Goldberg (1982). In this task, participants were 
required to remember the number of green dots on cards with various numbers of blue 
and green dots on each card. The number of green dots on each card ranged from one to 
five dots, and the total number of dots on each card ranged from three to seven dots. In 
this task, there were three “sets” of cards at each level.  For the first level, there was just 
one card in each set, for the second level there were two cards for each set, and so on. 
After each set of cards was presented, participants were required to recall the numbers of 
green dots on each card in that set in the order that the cards were presented. If a 
participant incorrectly stated any numbers in a set, that set was considered incorrect. The 
task was ended if a participant missed all three sets at a level.  
Second-Order Theory of Mind Task. This task included two stories (see Appendix 
A) developed by Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994) used to measure 
children’s ability to attribute second-order mental states. In this task, participants were 
required to make judgments about characters’ thoughts about another character’s 
thoughts. 
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Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Task. This task included four different stories 
(see Appendix B) in which two characters experienced the same negative (as opposed to 
neutral) or neutral (as opposed to positive) outcome. For one character, the alternative 
outcome that might have occurred would have resulted in the same negative outcome. For 
the other character, however, the alternative would have resulted in a more positive 
outcome. In two of the stories, the outcome was neutral, and the alternative would have 
been good. In the other two stories, the outcome was bad, and the alternative would have 
been neutral.  Thus, rather than manipulating factors thought to affect event mutability 
(typicality or an action or the degree to which a decision is framed as involving an act of 
omission vs. commission), the present study contrasted a character for whom “things 
might have been better” with a character for whom the two alternative possible courses of 
action would have resulted in the same outcome.  McCloy and Byrne (2002) have 
referred to this kind of comparison as a comparison between an “even-if” situation and an 
“if-only” situation.  In a study with adults, McCloy and Byrne confirmed that adults 
judge that feelings of regret are much more likely to occur in “if only” contexts than in 
“even if” contexts.  
There were also two versions of each story: explicit and non-explicit. The explicit 
version made specific reference to the characters thinking about the alternative outcome, 
whereas the non-explicit story simply stated the alternative outcome. In addition, two 
forms of each version of each story were created.  The two forms differed solely in terms 
of which character was talked about first in the story.  Cartoon pictures depicting scenes 
from each story were drawn to present to participants while an experimenter read each 
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scenario for all child participants. Comprehension questions for each of the 
counterfactual emotion reasoning scenarios were also used (see Appendix C).  
Procedure 
Adult participants received only the counterfactual emotion reasoning task. Adult 
participants were tested in groups of about 15-20 participants. These participants were 
presented printed copies of the stories to read.  These printed copies of the stories also 
included printed requests for judgments about the characters’ emotional responses.  
Adults provided written response to these questions.  
Child participants were tested one-on-one by an experimenter in a private, quiet 
location and completed all six tasks listed in the materials section. Each child was tested 
in two separate sessions.  The second session occurred on a separate day within two 
weeks of the first session. For all participants, the first session included the second-order 
Theory of Mind Task, the K-ABC Number Recall Task, and the PPVT. The second 
session included the Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Task and the M space span test. 
For the Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Task, an experimenter read each story 
while presenting the accompanying pictures. After an experimenter read each 
counterfactual emotion reasoning scenario, children were asked which character would 
feel worse about the outcome and were also asked to explain their answer. Children were 
also asked several comprehension questions for each story after this response was given 
for each scenario.  Half the participants in each age group received all “explicit” versions 
of each story, while the remaining participants received all non-explicit stories. The order 
of presentation of the different stories was counterbalanced across participants at each 
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age. At the end of the second session, children were given stickers as a token of 
appreciation for participating in the study
24 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Scoring Procedures 
PPVT. The standard procedure for scoring the PPVT was used.  For each 
participant, the total number of errors was subtracted from the ceiling item to create the 
participant’s raw score. The ceiling item was designated by the last item in the “ceiling 
set,” that is, the set during which the participant made eight or more incorrect responses. 
K-ABC Number Recall Task.  The standard procedure for scoring the K-ABC task 
was used.  The Number Recall Task was scored by subtracting the errors from the ceiling 
item to calculate the raw score. The ceiling item was designated by the last number in the 
ceiling set, which is the set in which the participant missed all items in the set or reached 
the stopping point for their age as designated by the K-ABC Number Recall task 
procedure. 
Second-order Theory of Mind Task. In this task, probe questions and control 
questions were used to make sure the children understood and remembered key elements 
of the stories. Feedback was given to children for these questions and incorrect answers 
were corrected. The second-order ignorance question, the second-order false belief 
question, and the justification question were coded as correct or incorrect based on the 
standards described in Sullivan et al. (1994). Participants were given a point for each 
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correct response for the second-order ignorance question, the second-order false belief 
question, and the justification question for each of the two stories resulting in a total score 
of 0-6 for each participant.  
M space Span task. Participants were given an M space span score equal to the 
highest level during which they were able to recall at least two out of three sets 
completely, as well as a third of a point for any higher levels where they only correctly 
stated totals from one set at that level. 
Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Task. Scores on the comprehension questions 
were examined to judge children’s comprehension and memory for the events of the 
story.  In order to score the participant’s responses to the emotion judgments questions, a 
“target response” was defined as the judgment that the character who could have 
experienced a better outcome would have felt worse than the character for whom the 
alternative course of action would have resulted in the same negative or neutral outcome.  
Participants were given a point for each story for which they responded with the “target 
response,” where they also provided a relevant explanation of counterfactual reasoning 
for the target, resulting in each participant receiving a score from 0-4.   
Preliminary Analyses 
Comprehension questions. Participants who scored less that 80% correct, as 
averaged over all four stories, on the comprehension questions were not included in the 
analysis. Eight of the excluded participants were in the 6-year-old age group, and two 
were in the 7-year-old age group. For the remaining participants, there was no significant 
difference between the scores of the 8-year-olds (M = 95.67, SD = 6.02) and the 7-year-
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olds (M = 95.33, SD = 4.56), F(1, 100) = .06, p = .81, but the 7-year-olds did perform 
significantly better on the comprehension questions than the 6-year-olds (M = 90.90, SD
= 6.73), F(1, 100) = 9.74, p = .002. For the remaining participants, there was no 
significant difference between the scores of the 8-year-olds (M = 95.67, SD = 6.02) and 
the 7-year-olds (M = 95.33, SD = 4.56), F(1, 100) = .06, p = .81, but the 7-year-olds did 
perform significantly better on the comprehension questions than the 6-year-olds (M =
90.90, SD = 6.73), F(1, 100) = 9.74, p = .002.
Gender effects. The first analysis assessed whether there were gender differences 
with respect to judgments of emotion responses.  Males (M = .97, SD = 1.32) and females 
(M = .91, SD = 1.38) were equally likely to state that the target characters in the 
counterfactual stories were more likely to feel worse than the other character.  The main 
effect of gender was not significant, nor did gender interact with age.  Accordingly, 
gender was not included as a variable in any further analyses.   
Story effects. Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning scores did not vary significantly 
across the four different stories.  Accordingly, “story” was not included as a variable in 
any further analyses.  
Salience and Age Effects 
A 4 (age) X 2 (explicitness) between-subjects ANOVA was performed to assess 
the effects of these variables on the counterfactual emotions task score. There was a main 
effect of age group for performance on the counterfactual emotions reasoning task, F(3, 
128) = 33.09, p < .001. A Tukey HSD analysis showed that adults (M = 2.61, SE = .18)
were more likely to give the target response than were the 8-year-olds (M = 1.02, SE =
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.17), p < .001. Also, the 8-year-olds were more likely to give the target response than 
were the 7-year-olds (M = .33, SE = .17), p = .048, and the 6-year-olds (M = .34, SE =
.17), p = .42, who did not significantly differ from each other, p = 1.00. 
The main effect of explicitness was not significant, F < 1.  However, there was a 
significant Age X Explicitness interaction, F(3, 139) = 2.90, p < .05. Figure 2 reveals 
that, whereas there was little if any effect of explicitness for the 6-year-olds, 7-year-olds, 
and adults, the 8-year-olds were much more likely to give the target response in the more 
explicit condition than in the less explicit condition. 
There was an overall age difference for the more explicit condition, F(3, 63) = 
14.04, p < .001. A Tukey HSD analysis was performed to further investigate the age 
differences in the explicit and non-explicit versions. In the more explicit condition, adults 
(M = 2.44, SD = 1.36) were marginally more likely to give the target response than 8-year 
olds (M = 1.44, SD = 1.55), p = .067. Eight-year-olds were significantly more likely to 
give the target response than 7-year-olds (M = .11, SD = .32), p = .006. Seven-year-olds 
and 6-year-olds (M = .47, SD = 1.01) did not differ significantly in their tendency to give 
the target response, p = .836.  
There were also overall age differences for the less explicit version, F(3, 66) = 
24.28, p < .001, though there was a different pattern for this condition. Adults (M = 2.77,
SD = 1.11) were more likely to give the target response than the 8-year-olds (M = .60, SD
= .94), p < .001. However, there were no significant differences between the 8-year-olds 
and the 7-year-olds (M = .61, SD = 1.14), p = .998, the 8-year-olds and the 6-year-olds 
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(M = .21, SD = .58), p = .650, and the 7-year-olds and the 6-year-olds in the less explicit 
version, p = .750.
The 8-year-olds were the only age group to show a difference in target responses 
between the less and more explicit conditions, t(34) = 2.01, p < .05.
Individual Differences 
Means and standard deviations by age groups can be found in Table 1. Table 2 
presents the simple correlations between Age (in months), K-ABC scores, M space span 
scores, PPVT scores, second-order TOM scores, and Counterfactual Emotions Reasoning 
Task scores. In order to examine which factors served as reliable predictors of scores on 
the Emotion Judgment Task, a series of stepwise regression analyses were performed 
with Emotion Judgments Task scores as the dependent variable.  In all of these analyses, 
age was entered as the first predictor variable, followed by one of the other individual 
difference measures. 
These analyses revealed that, although the PPVT score (verbal ability) had the 
highest simple correlation with Emotion Judgment scores, it did not remain a significant 
predictor when age was entered into the regression first. After age was entered into the 
stepwise regression, the only factor that remained predictive of performance on the 
counterfactual emotion reasoning task was the second-order ToM task score, F(1, 99) = 
4.65, p <.05 (see Table 3). 
A similar set of analyses was also performed separately for the more explicit and 
less explicit conditions of the Counterfactual Emotions Reasoning task. For participants 
who received the more explicit version of the task, again the only variable that remained 
29 
a predictor of Emotion Judgment scores after partialling out the effects of Age was 
second order ToM task performance, F(1, 48) = 4.75, p <.05. For the participants who 
received the less explicit version of the task, none of the variables significantly predicted 
performance on the counterfactual emotions reasoning task, including age. 
Second-order Theory of Mind Task 
Previous studies by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004), Perner et al. (2004) and 
Riggs et al. (1998), have examined counterfactual reasoning as a predictor of theory of 
mind performance.  Accordingly, a set of regression analyses was conducted here in 
which ToM scores served as the dependent variable.  As was done with the analyses 
described above, age was always entered as the first predictor variable, followed by each 
of the other individual difference variables, including Emotion Judgment scores as a 
predictor. These analyses revealed that, after partialling out the effects of age, K-ABC 
number span scores, F(1, 100) = 4.15, p <.05,  PPVT scores, F(1, 100) = 20.74, p < .001,
and the Counterfactual Emotions Reasoning scores, F(1, 100) = 7.68, p = .<.05, were all 
still significant predictors of the second order ToM task performance.  A set of analyses 
was then conducted involving all possible orderings of more than one individual 
differences variable (after partialling out the effects of Age).  These analyses revealed 
that, among the individual difference variables that were included in the present study, 
PPVT performance was the most important predictor of ToM task performance; PPVT 
remained a significant predictor even when it was entered after each of the other 
variables, whereas none of the other variables remained a significant predictor when 
entered after PPVT scores.
30 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
The major goals of this study were to investigate the pattern of age differences for 
reasoning about counterfactual emotions, to study the effects of salience of the 
counterfactual alternative on task performance, and to examine individual difference 
factors that may affect this performance.  
Adults’ responses on the Emotion Judgment task demonstrated an understanding 
that when two people experience the same negative or neutral outcome, one is likely to 
feel worse than the other if that first individual thinks about how things would have been 
better if an alternative course of action had been chosen. In contrast, children at all ages 
tested here usually judged that both characters would feel the same. The exception to this 
pattern of results occurred with just one version of the stories with the 8-year-olds. 
Children at this age responded like younger children when the story did not stress that 
one of the characters was reflecting on how things might have been better.  In contrast, 8-
year-olds tended to respond more similarly to adults when the counterfactual thinking of 
the characters was made particularly salient in the story.   
Gleicher et al. argued that, when a course of action leads to a positive outcome, 
adults are unlikely to reflect on “what might have been” unless some other feature of the 
situation serves as a strong trigger for such counterfactual thinking.  In the present study, 
the 8-year-olds responded to stories describing negative outcomes in a manner very 
31 
similar to the way adults in Gleicher et al.’s study responded to stories describing events 
leading to positive outcomes.  In each case, there was very little evidence that “what 
might have been” was taken into account unless the counterfactual possibility was made 
very salient in the story.   
For children younger than age 8, however, participants failed to factor “what 
might have been” into their judgments even with the more explicit versions.  This finding 
was somewhat surprising, because the stories used in the present study were quite similar 
to those used by Guttentag and Ferrell (2004), who found that even at 7-year-of-age 
children seemed to understand not only that upward counterfactual thinking can make 
someone feel worse about a negative event that actually occurred, but also that both 
typicality of a course of action and whether or not a behavioral decision is thought of as 
an act of commission or omission can affect the intensity of regret.   
Despite their overall similarity, there were a couple of ways in which the stories 
used in the present study differed from those used by Guttentag and Ferrell.  One 
difference was that the present stories did not include any mention of typicality of the 
courses of action or the degree to which the courses of action involved acts of 
commission vs. omission.  A second difference was that in the Guttentag and Ferrell 
stories, both characters were in a situation in which counterfactual thinking would have 
involved reflecting on upward counterfactuals; for both characters, the likely alternative 
course of action would have resulted in a better outcome than what actually occurred.    
In contrast, in the present study, for one of the characters, the alternative course of action 
would have resulted in the same outcome as the course of action that actually occurred.  
32 
These features of the stories used the present study were included specifically to make the 
stories easier for the younger children to understand.  Accordingly, it had been 
hypothesized that a mature pattern of responding would be found at younger age in the 
present study than had been the case in Guttentag and Ferrell (2004).  Contrary to 
expectations, the opposite pattern was found; features of the present stories that were 
designed to simplify the stories ended up actually making the counterfactual thinking 
element of the stories less salient and/or less supportive of the child’s reflecting on the 
effects of upward counterfactual thinking on emotional responding. 
It is not known exactly which feature of the stories used in the present study is 
responsible for the differences found between the present findings and those reported by 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004).  One possibility is that the inclusion of a situation for one 
character in which the alternative course of action would have produced the same 
outcome may have reduced the salience of “what might have been.”  Indeed, previous 
researchers (McCloy & Byrne, 2002) have suggested that semifactual reasoning (where 
the alternative choice would have led to the same outcome) is represented differently than 
counterfactual reasoning, causing people to see the antecedent as less causal than in 
situations of counterfactual reasoning.  While participants in the present study were not 
asked specifically to undo the outcomes, this added layer of difficulty with the 
semifactual character may have elevated the age where understanding of counterfactual 
emotions was found compared to previous studies. 
Even though the pattern of differences between the findings in the present study 
and those found by Guttentag and Ferrell was not in the expected direction, the mere fact 
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that a different pattern of results was found provides further support for the view that age 
differences in the tendency to reflect on the effects of counterfactual thinking interacts 
with the degree to which a specific story or situation makes such thinking more or less 
salient.   Elements of the stories used by Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) provided a stronger 
trigger for reflection on the effects on emotional responses of “what might have been” 
than was  the case with the stories used here.   Similarly, negative outcomes provide a 
stronger trigger for such thinking than do positive outcomes, and the salient versions of 
the stories used here provided a stronger trigger than was the case with the less salient 
versions. 
Measures of individual differences revealed that a key predictor of understanding 
characters’ counterfactual-thinking-based emotions was their ability to take other 
people’s perspectives, as measured by a second order Theory of Mind task. This finding 
is not surprising, as there are clear parallels between comparing two characters’ thought 
processes and resulting emotions (counterfactual emotion reasoning task) and thinking 
about a character’s thoughts about another character’s thoughts. Essentially, both tasks 
require a sophisticated ability to think about others’ complex thoughts.   More directly, 
making adult-like judgments on the Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning task used here 
would seem to be dependent upon the ability to take the perspective of the characters in 
the stories in order to judge what the characters’ emotional responses would be.  Due to 
these similarities, it is more likely that a general ability of social cognition and 
perspective taking using other people’s mental states may be driving these performances 
on both the Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning task and the second order Theory of Mind 
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task, than a case that second order false belief understanding is driving the ability to 
understand people’s emotions based on their counterfactual reasoning.  
When the second order TOM task was used as a dependent measure, verbal ability 
(as measured by scores on the PPVT) emerged as a significant predictor of second-order 
ToM performance, even after partialling out the effects of age and the effects of the other 
individual difference variables measured here. This finding suggests that verbal ability 
may be an important influence on perspective taking, and social cognition in general, 
although the exact reason for this relationship is unclear.  One possibility is that language 
may play an important role in the representation of social cognitive concepts.  Further 
research, however, is needed to determine the nature of the relationship between language 
ability and second order ToM ability.  
Previous studies investigating the relationship between false belief tasks and 
counterfactual reasoning (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Perner et al., 2004; Riggs & 
Peterson, 2000; Riggs et al., 1998) have all studied these variables under the assumption 
that counterfactual reasoning ability affects the ability to understand false beliefs and 
mental states. These studies, however, were interested in a younger age group, where the 
ability to reason counterfactually is based on understanding more physical, concrete 
situations with alternatives, as opposed to the addition of understanding how this 
reasoning affects people’s emotions. The current study assumes the opposite direction 
between these two variables because intuitively, the basic ability to think about someone 
else’s thoughts, or in this case someone’s thoughts about someone else’s thoughts, is 
necessary for understanding why two people who experience the same outcome would 
35 
feel differently.  It is possible that processes involved in understanding people’s mental 
states and the ability to reason about abstract possibilities develop together over 
childhood interacting with one another to develop a more sophisticated social cognition.  
The present findings beg that important question of what it is that is developing 
between the ages of 5 and 9 years to allow children to make sophisticated judgments of 
another person’s feelings based on their mental activities. While previous studies (Amsel 
et al., 2003; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Meehan & Byrne, 2005) have shown that children 
as young as 5 and 6 years are able to understand both how an event can be mentally 
mutated and how they and others would feel if this alternative event had occurred, they 
are still unable to understand how people’s emotions are affected by these mental 
mutations. While perspective taking as measured by the second order TOM task was 
found to be predictive of performance in understanding these counterfactual emotions, it 
does not fully explain the difficulties children at these ages have with understanding other 
people’s counterfactual emotions since children by this age are able to correctly 
understand the false beliefs of others. 
Bradmetz and Schneider (1999) proposed with false belief tasks that while 
children are able to correctly perform a false belief task by 4 years of age, it is not until 7-
8 years of age that children are able to form a coherent, logical understanding of the 
concept of a false belief. They state that between the ages of 4 to 8 years, although 
children may be able to separately understand emotions, beliefs, and desires, children still 
show contradictory judgments about these states. Particularly, young children can show 
the understanding that a character may hold a false belief, and demonstrate they know 
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what that false belief is despite knowing the true situation. However, when asked to 
describe the emotion the character with that false belief is experiencing, they respond 
based on the true belief of which they are aware but is unknown to the character. For 
example, the younger participants understood that Little Red Riding Hood thinks that her 
grandmother is in the house, even though they knew that actually the Big Bad Wolf was 
really in the house. However when asked how Little Red Riding Hood would feel before 
going into the house, the younger participants seemed to ignore the false belief of Little 
Red Riding Hood and instead use their own knowledge to respond that she would feel 
scared.  Bradmetz and Schneider suggest that it is not until after 7 years of age that they 
gain a “third-person structure” that allows them to overcome these contradictions and 
coordinate these judgments.  This third-person structure moves children from a second-
person structure of being aware of mental states and being able to represent these mental 
states to coordinating all this knowledge around 7-8 years of age. In relation to the 
current study, it may not be just coordination of false belief tasks that must develop, but 
an overall coordination of all of the steps needed as outlined by Gleicher et al. (1990). 
The idea of a change in coordination and use of representations has also been suggested 
by Meehan and Byrne (2005). They state that 6-year-olds may have difficulty updating 
their representation of the real events with their representation of the counterfactual 
event. 
It is possible, therefore, that performance on tasks where children are required to 
understand people’s emotions due to their differing mental activities is the result of both 
separately developing social and cognitive skills and the overall ability to coordinate all 
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these abilities. Looking back at the modified model derived from Gleicher et al. (1990) 
(see Figure 1), while children may have the abilities to perform each step of this model, it 
may be the coordination of all these processes that is causing difficulty. If these abilities 
are not fully developed, however, it seems possible to provide support, as was shown 
with the salience manipulation in the present study, to boost these lacking abilities so that 
participants (such as many of the 8-year-olds in the present study) are able to show an 
adult-like pattern of performance on the task. Younger children however, may need more 
support to coordinate these parts of the model, or support for the separate abilities needed 
for the different steps in the process of understanding counterfactual emotions.  
Future Directions  
A fairly direct follow-up to the present study might be to provide participants with 
knowledge of characters’ emotions and ask them to justify why the characters feel this 
way.  For example, participants might be told that Allison, who would have won the big 
prize if she had chosen the other box, feels worse than Britney, who would have won 
nothing no matter which box she chose.  Thus, instead of requiring participants to 
generate judgments of emotional responses based upon the details of the situations, they 
would be provided the presumably simpler task of figuring out which features of the 
situation were responsible for the emotions that the  participant has been told that the 
characters felt.   The provision of the information about a character’s emotional response 
would presumably instigate an active search for any features of the situation than might 
produce such a response.  As such, this kind of task might be hypothesized to provide 
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maximum support for the child’s reflection on the effects of “what might have been” on 
emotional responses.   
A potentially instructive direction for future research might also be to use 
Gleicher et al.’s model to investigate whether there are age differences at other steps of 
the process of making counterfactual-reasoning-base emotions judgments other than at 
step one.  For example, what role does the judged likelihood of the counterfactual 
outcome play in children’s judgments of emotional responses.  Are children even able to 
weigh the effects of a relatively more likely counterfactual vs. a less likely 
counterfactual?   
The lack of ability to understand counterfactual emotions in the childhood years 
may also be related to brain development in the areas needed to understand such complex 
emotions. Because the orbitofrontal cortex is important in the role of cognitive and 
emotional factors influencing decision making, such as counterfactual reasoning and 
regret, it may be a lack of neurological development affecting the problems young 
children have with understanding counterfactual emotions such as regret, disappointment, 
and relief.  
Another direction for future research might involve more direct assessments of 
how children actually feel in the kinds of situations in which adults typically experience 
regret and relief, and whether children of different ages who have begun to feel regret in 
certain situations make decisions about possible courses of action based upon the 
anticipation of regret. It is known that the anticipation of regret can have potent 
influences on adult decision making.  Recent studies have shown that children as old as 9 
39 
and 10 years of age do not seem to understand how the anticipation of regret and 
disappointment influence people’s decisions (Ferrell & Guttentag, in press).   
Interestingly, these findings are consistent with research suggesting that the anticipation 
of regret is based upon the use of brain regions that are not fully mature until well into the 
teen years. Camille et al. (2004) found that adult patients who had orbitofrontal cortex 
lesions exhibited a pattern of decision making in gambling task that was not reflective of 
the kind of “avoidance of regret” decisions that are made by individual without such 
lesions (resulting, interestingly, in the patients actually making more statistically 
normative judgments than did normal participants). These findings raise the interesting 
possibility that anticipation of regret may not serve as a significant factor influencing 
decision making until individuals are well into their teen years.  
Summary 
These results overall show that understanding counterfactual emotions, such as 
regret, can be affected by both task demands of salience and individual differences. 
While younger children may not typically show understanding that a character’s 
counterfactual reasoning affects their emotional response to an outcome, they may be 
able to show this ability to understand if they are provided with certain cues such as 
stating how a character is thinking about an alternative. Based on the effect of the 
explicitness of the alternative and the predictive quality of the second order theory of 
mind task, perhaps younger children do not respond like adults when given 
counterfactual emotion reasoning tasks because although they can think about other 
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people’s thoughts and emotions, and have the ability to reason counterfactually, they 
have difficulty combining these skills.  
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Appendix A. Tables and Figures 
Table 1  
Means (and Standard Deviations) by Age Group for Individual Difference Measures 
6-year-olds  7-year-olds  8-year-olds  Adults 
K-ABC 10.63 (2.07)  11.72 (1.97)  12.75 (2.06)  --  
PPVT  89.82 (11.41)  107.97 (14.65) 123.89 (10.44) -- 
M-space 2.33 (0.89)  3.25 (1.05)  3.75 (1.02)  -- 
2nd ToM 3.48 (1.23)  3.42 (1.32)  4.33 (1.24)  -- 
Cf. Emo. 0.33 (0.82)  0.36 (0.87)  0.97 (1.30)       2.61 (1.23) 
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Table 2 
Correlations of Age (in Months) and Tasks Measuring Individual Differences with 
Correlations with Age in Months Partialled out in Parentheses 
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Age (months)    .40*** .73*** .51*** .24* .24* 
 
2. K-ABC span task     .42*** .36*** .27** .10 
(.21*) (.19*) (.20*) (.01) 
 
3. PPVT       .49*** .45*** .28** 
(.22*) (.41***) (.16) 
 
4. M-space span task       .13 .20* 
(.00) (.09) 
 
5. 2nd Order ToM task        .25** 
(.21*) 
 
6. Counterfactual Emotion task 
 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
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Table 3 
Summary of Stepwise Regression Analysis of Individual Difference Task Scores as a 
Predictor of Performance on the Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Task 
Variable  Step Action       SeqSS R2 ∆R2 p-value 
Age   1 added        6.61 .058   --      .015 
2nd ord. ToM  2 added        4.86 .100 .042      .033* 
PPVT   3 added        .66 .106 .006      .430 
M space  4 added        .66 .111 .005      .431 
K-ABC  5 added        .46 .115 .004      .512 
Note.   Age = Age of participants in months (excluding adult participants); 2nd ord. ToM 
= scores on the Second order Theory of Mind task (as adapted from Sullivan, Zaitchik, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 1994); PPVT = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 3rd edition scores; M 
space = M space span task scores (as adapted from Case, Kurland, and Goldberg, 1982); 
K-ABC = K-ABC Number Recall task scores   
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Figure 1.   Depiction of model as proposed by Gleicher et al. (1990) in bold lines, with 
added aspects of steps needed to judge two characters’ emotions from counterfactual 
reasoning in dashed lines. 
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Figure 2.   Mean counterfactual emotion task scores for Age X Explicitness Condition. 
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Appendix B. Second Order Theory of Mind Stories 
 
Birthday Puppy story- 2nd order theory of mind task (from Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-
Flusberg, 1994)  
 
Tonight is Peter’s birthday and Mom is surprising him with a puppy. She has hidden the 
puppy in the basement. Peter says, “Mom, I really hope you get me a puppy for my 
birthday.” Remember, Mom wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, instead of telling 
Peter she got him a puppy, Mom says, “Sorry Peter, I did not get you a puppy for your 
birthday, I got you a really great toy instead.”  
 
Probe Question 1: “Did Mom really get Peter a toy for his birthday?” 
Probe Question 2: “Did Mom tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday?” 
Probe Question 3: “Why did Mom tell Peter that she got him a toy for his birthday?” 
 
Now, Peter says to Mom, “I’m going outside to play.” On his way outside, Peter goes 
down to the basement to fetch his roller skates. In the basement, Peter finds the birthday 
puppy! Peter says to himself, “Wow, Mom didn’t get me a toy, she really got me a puppy 
for my birthday.” Mom does not see Peter go down to the basement and find the birthday 
puppy. 
 
Nonlinguistic control question: “Does Peter know that his Mom got him a puppy for his 
birthday?” 
 
Linguistic control question: “Does Mom know that Peter saw the birthday puppy in the 
basement?” 
 
Now, the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter’s grandmother calls to find out what tie the 
birthday party is. Grandma asks Mom on the phone, “Does Peter know what you really 
got him for his birthday?” 
 
Second-order ignorance question: “What does Mom say to Grandma?” 
 
Memory aid: Now remember, Mom does not know that Peter saw what she got him for 
his birthday. 
 
Then Grandma says to Mom, “What does Peter think you got him for his birthday?” 
 
Second-order false belief question: “What does Mom say to Grandma?” 
 
Justification question: “Why does Mom say that?” 
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Chocolate Bar story- 2nd order theory of mind task 
 
John and Mary’s mom leaves a chocolate bar on the table and goes out to the 
store. John puts the chocolate bar in a drawer and tells Mary, his sister, that the chocolate 
bar is in the pantry because he wants to keep it all for himself.  
 
Probe Question #1: Is the chocolate bar really in the pantry? 
Probe Question #2: Did John tell Mary that the chocolate bar is in the pantry? 
Probe Question #3: Why did John tell Mary that the chocolate bar is in the pantry? 
 
Later, John decides to eat a piece of the chocolate bar and takes it out of the drawer and 
puts it back in the drawer. Mary is peeking behind the corner and sees John take the 
candy bar out of the drawer, but John doesn’t see Mary there watching him. 
 
Nonlinguistic control question: “Does Mary know that the chocolate bar is in the 
drawer?” 
 
Linguistic control question: “Does John know that Mary saw that the chocolate bar is in 
the drawer?” 
 
Now, Mom comes home. Mom asks John, “Does Mary know where the chocolate 
bar is?”  
 
Second-order ignorance question: “What does John say to Mom?” 
 
Memory aid: Now remember, John does not know that Mary saw him take a piece of the 
chocolate bar out of the drawer.  
 
Then Mom says to John, “Where does Mary think the chocolate bar is?” 
 
Second-order false belief question: “What does John say to Mom?” 
 
Justification question: “Why does John say that?” 
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Appendix C. Counterfactual Emotion Reasoning Stories 
 
OK Outcome/ Most Explicit 
Allison and Britney are in different kindergarten classes at the same school. Today 
Allison and Britney both get chosen to play the game in their classes. In this game, the 
teacher brings out a big barrel that has lots of small boxes inside it. Some of the small 
boxes have a really nice prize in them, but others have nothing. To play the game, a child 
first picks two small boxes from the barrel. Then the child gets to choose which of those 
two she wants to keep. If the one she picks has a prize, she gets the prize. If it has 
nothing, the child gets nothing. 
 
Allison shuts her eyes and picks two boxes from the barrel- a red box and a blue box. 
Then after thinking for a long time, she picks the blue box as the one she wants to keep. 
She opens it and it has nothing in it. The teacher then opens the red box to show Allison 
that the red box that Allison didn’t choose had the big prize in it. Allison thinks about 
how if she had only picked the red box instead of the blue box, she would have won the 
big prize instead of winning nothing. 
 
Britney shuts her eyes and picks two boxes from the barrel in her classroom. She picks a 
green box and an orange box. Then, after thinking for a long time, Britney decides to 
keep the green box. She opens it and it has nothing in it. The teacher then opens the 
orange box and shows Britney that it didn’t have anything in it either. Britney thinks 
about how even if she had kept the other box, she wouldn’t have won anything anyway.  
 
So, each girl picked two boxes from the barrel, each got to keep just one of the two 
boxes, and each girl ended up with a box that didn’t have a prize in it. Both Britney and 
Allison feel a bit bad about not winning anything. Do you think one of them feels worse 
than the other? 
 
Allison, who thought about how she would have won the big prize if she’d kept the other 
box, 
Or Britney, who thought about how she would have won nothing no matter which box 
she kept at the end, 
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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OK Outcome/ Least Explicit 
Allison and Britney are in different kindergarten classes at the same school. Today 
Allison and Britney both get chosen to play the game in their classes. In this game, the 
teacher brings out a big barrel that has lots of small boxes inside it. Some of the small 
boxes have a really nice prize in them, but others have nothing. To play the game, a child 
first picks two small boxes from the barrel. Then the child gets to choose which of those 
two she or he wants to keep. If the one she has a prize, she gets the prize. If it has 
nothing, the child gets nothing. 
 
Allison picks two boxes from the barrel- a red box and a blue box. Then after thinking for 
a long time, she picks the blue box as the one she wants to keep. She opens it and it has 
nothing in it. The teacher then opens the red box to show Allison that the red box that 
Allison didn’t choose had the big prize in it.  
 
Britney also picks two boxes from the barrel in her classroom. She picks a green box and 
an orange box. Then, after thinking for a long time, Britney decides to keep the green 
box. She opens it and it has nothing in it. The teacher then opens the orange box and 
shows Britney that it didn’t have anything in it either.  
 
So, each girl picked two boxes from the barrel, each got to keep just one of the two 
boxes, and each girl ended up with a box that didn’t have a prize in it. Both Britney and 
Allison feel a bit bad about not winning anything. Do you think one of them feels worse 
than the other? 
 
Allison,  
Or Britney,  
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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Bad Outcome, Most Explicit 
 
Chris and Dave live in different neighborhoods and ride their bikes to school everyday. 
There are several paths to choose from to get to school, and usually all the paths take the 
same amount of time and are all easy routes to school. 
 
There are two paths that are near Chris’s house, one that goes past a pond and one that 
goes past a playground. Chris goes both ways equally to school. Today Chris decided to 
go on the path that goes past the pond. Today unfortunately a tree branch fell across the 
path that goes past the pond and Chris hit the branch, fell off his bike, and was late to 
school. When he got to school, he found out from another boy that the other path that 
goes past a playground was clear. Chris thinks about how if he had taken the path that 
goes past the playground instead of the path he took instead, he wouldn’t have fallen off 
his bike and been late to school. 
 
Dave has two different paths near his house too that he takes to school. One path goes 
past a stream of water, and the other path goes past a field of flowers. Dave decides to go 
on the path that goes past the flowers. A tree branch also fell on that path and he also hits 
the branch, falls off his bike and is late to school. When he gets to school, Dave finds out 
that there was a big branch that fell across the path that goes past the stream too. Dave 
thinks about how even if he chose the path that went past the stream, he still probably 
would have fallen off his bike and been late to school.   
 
So, each boy has two paths to choose from to ride their bikes to school, each chose a 
certain path, and each boy hit a branch and fell of his bike, got hurt, and was late to 
school. Both Chris and Dave feel bad about falling off their bikes. Do you think one of 
them feels worse than the other? 
 
Chris, who thought about how he wouldn’t have hit a branch if he had chosen the other 
path that went past the playground,  
Or Dave, who thought about how he would probably would have hit a branch no matter 
which path he chose  
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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Bad Outcome, Least Explicit 
 
Chris and Dave live in different neighborhoods and ride their bikes to school everyday. 
There are several paths to choose from to get to school, and usually all the paths take the 
same amount of time and are all easy routes to school. 
 
There are two paths that are near Chris’s house, one that goes past a pond and one that 
goes past a playground. Chris goes both ways equally to school. Today Chris decided to 
go on the path that goes past the pond. Today unfortunately a tree branch fell across the 
path that goes past the pond and Chris hit the branch, fell off his bike, and was late to 
school. When he got to school, he found out from another boy that the other path that 
goes past a playground was clear.  
 
Dave has two different paths near his house too that he takes to school. One path goes 
past a stream of water, and the other path goes past a field of flowers. Dave decides to go 
on the path that goes past the flowers. A tree branch also fell on that path and he also hits 
the branch, falls off his bike and is late to school. When he gets to school, Dave finds out 
that there was a big branch that fell across the path that goes past the stream too.  
 
So, each boy has two paths to choose from to ride their bikes to school, each chose a 
certain path, and each boy hit a branch and fell of his bike, got hurt, and was late to 
school. Both Chris and Dave feel bad about falling off their bikes. Do you think one of 
them feels worse than the other? 
 
Chris,  
Or Dave,  
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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Bad Outcome/ Most Explicit 
Faith and Emily go to different schools with different playgrounds. One day they are each 
at recess and want to swing on the swings.   
 
Faith looks at the two swings that are there. She tries to decide between the two swings 
and then decides to go on the one on the left. After Faith gets on the swing, the swing 
breaks and Faith falls to the ground and gets a little bit hurt. She notices that the swing 
was already a little broken so that is why she fell. Then she looks at the other swing and 
notices that that swing was a little broken too. Faith thinks about how even if she had 
picked the other swing, she still would have fallen down because it was broken too.  
 
On Emily’s playground, Emily also goes to swing on the swingset with two swings. She 
decides to get on the one on the left on her swingset too. The swing that Emily decides to 
get on is also a little broken and the swing breaks and Emily falls down and gets hurt a 
little. Emily looks at the other swing and see that it was not broken. Emily thinks about if 
only she had gotten onto the other swing, she wouldn’t have fallen down and gotten hurt.  
 
So, each girl chose a swing on their playground and their swings broke so both fell down 
and got hurt. Both Emily and Faith feel a bad about falling down. Do you think one of 
them feels worse than the other? 
 
Faith, who thinks about if she picked the other swing she probably would have fallen no 
matter which swing she chose 
Or Emily, who thought about how she wouldn’t have fallen if she had picked the other 
swing 
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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Bad Outcome/ Least Explicit 
Faith and Emily go to different schools with different playgrounds. One day they are each 
at recess and want to swing on the swings.   
 
Faith runs up to the swing set at her school and looks at the two swings that are there. She 
tries to decide between the two swings and then decides to go on the one on the left. After 
Faith gets on the swing, the swing breaks and Faith falls to the ground and gets a little bit 
hurt. She notices that the swing was already a little broken so that is why she fell. Then 
she looks at the other swing and notices that that swing was a little broken too.  
 
On Emily’s playground, Emily also goes to swing on the swingset with two swings. She 
decides to get on the one on the left on her swingset too. The swing that Emily decides to 
get on is also a little broken and the swing breaks and Emily falls down and gets hurt a 
little. Emily looks at the other swing and see that it was not broken. 
 
So, each girl chose a swing on their playground and their swings broke so both fell down 
and got hurt. Both Emily and Faith feel a bad about falling down. Do you think one of 
them feels worse than the other? 
 
Faith,  
Or Emily,  
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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OK Outcome, Most Explicit 
 
Greg and Henry are in the same class at school and are going to lunch. The teacher tells 
them she has a special surprise- that all the kids get a piece of cake because it is her 
birthday, but all the pieces of cake are in little boxes that are the same size but are all 
different colors. Some pieces are big, some are little. Greg and Henry both like cake a lot. 
The teacher places two boxes in front of each child and they each pick one box. 
 
Greg gets two boxes- a red one and a yellow one. He looks at both of them and decides to 
keep the red one. He opens it up and sees he got a small piece of cake. The teacher opens 
up the yellow box that he didn’t pick and Greg sees that there was a big piece of cake in 
that one. Greg thinks about how if he had only kept the yellow box instead of the red box 
he would have had the big piece of cake. 
 
Henry gets two boxes also- a blue one and a green one. He looks at both of them and 
decides to keep the blue one. He opens it up and sees that he also gets a small piece of 
cake. The teacher shows him that in the green box that he didn’t pick, there was a small 
piece of cake in that box too, that is the same size as Henry’s. Henry thinks about how if 
he had kept the green box, he would have still gotten a small piece of cake. 
 
So, both boys chose between two boxes and got a small piece of cake. Greg and Henry 
are both a little sad that their pieces of cake are so small. 
 
Do you think one of them feels worse than the other? 
 
Greg, who thinks about how he would have gotten a big piece if had picked the other box 
Or Henry, who thinks about how he would have gotten a small piece even if he had 
picked the other box 
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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OK Outcome, Least Explicit 
 
Greg and Henry are in the same class at school and are going to lunch. The teacher tells 
them she has a special surprise- that all the kids get a piece of cake because it is her 
birthday, but all the pieces of cake are in little boxes that are the same size but are all 
different colors. Some pieces are big, some are little. Greg and Henry both like cake a lot. 
The teacher places two boxes in front of each child and they each pick one box. 
 
Greg gets two boxes- a red one and a yellow one. He looks at both of them and decides to 
keep the red one. He opens it up and sees he got a small piece of cake. The teacher opens 
up the yellow box that he didn’t pick and Greg sees that there was a big piece of cake in 
that one.  
 
Henry gets two boxes also- a blue one and a green one. He looks at both of them and 
decides to keep the blue one. He opens it up and sees that he also gets a small piece of 
cake. The teacher shows him that in the green box that he didn’t pick, there was a small 
piece of cake in that box too, that is the same size as Henry’s.  
 
So, both boys chose between two boxes and got a small piece of cake. Greg and Henry 
are both a little sad that their pieces of cake are so small. 
 
Do you think one of them feels worse than the other? 
 
Greg, 
Or Henry,  
Or do you think they’d feel the same? 
 
Why? 
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Appendix D. Comprehension Questions 
 
Allison and Britney 
 
How many girls are in the story? 
In the game, how many boxes did each girl get to pick out the barrel at first? 
How many boxes did each girl get to open? 
Did either girl win the big prize? 
Did either girl have the big prize in the box she didn’t pick?  
 
Chris and Dave 
 
How many boys are in the story? 
How many ways does each boy have to choose from to get to school? 
What happened to each boy on his way to school? 
Was the branch on both paths for each boy or just one boy? 
 
Faith and Emily 
 
How many girls are in the story? 
How many swings to they have to choose from on their playground? 
What happened when each girl sat on her chosen swing? 
Was the other swing broken too for both girls or just one girl? 
 
Greg and Henry 
 
How many boys are in the story? 
How many pieces of cake does each boy get to choose from? 
What size cake did each boy get? 
Was there a big piece of cake in the unchosen box for either boy? 
